Constitutional Law - Equal Protection of Laws - Exclusion of Married Students from Extracurricular Activities by Chapman, Charles L.
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 52 Number 3 Article 5 
1975 
Constitutional Law - Equal Protection of Laws - Exclusion of 
Married Students from Extracurricular Activities 
Charles L. Chapman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Chapman, Charles L. (1975) "Constitutional Law - Equal Protection of Laws - Exclusion of Married 
Students from Extracurricular Activities," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 52 : No. 3 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol52/iss3/5 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. 
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS-EXCLUSION OF
MARRIED STUDENTS FROM EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES
Regulations of the Rushville Consolidated School Corporation,
Rushville, Indiana,1 and the Indiana High School Athletic Asso-
ciation, 2 denied married high school students the opportunity to
participate in extracurricular activities, including interscholastic ath-
letics. Plaintiff Jerry Raike married during his senior year of high
school and immediately brought an action for a temporary restrain-
ing order and declaratory judgment to ensure his eligibility for high
school athletics.3 The trial court granted the temporary restrain-
ing order, 4 and, w'hen the same court considered the merits nine
months later, it held that the married student activity rules viola-
ted both the equal protection and due process guarantees of the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
and entered a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction
against both defendants.6 Rushville and the Indiana High School
Athletics Association appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond District of Indiana, where a unanimous court affirmed the trial
court decision and held that the regulations failed to satisfy the
"intermediate" equal protection scrutiny 7 used by the United States
Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed." Indiana High School Athletic
Association v. Raike, -Ind. App.,- 329 N.E.2d 66 (1975)
Prior to the decision in Raike, attacks upon similar married
student activity rules had been rejected in state courts,9 with one
1. Rushville Consolidated School Corporation maintained the following rule for married
students:
Married students, or those who have been married, are in school chiefly
to meet academic needs and they will be disqualified from participating in
extracurricular activities and Senior activities except Commencement and
Baccalaureate.
Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. IRaike, - Ind. App.- , 329 N.E.2d 66, 69-70
(1975).
2. Indiana High School Athletic Association, a voluntary association of Indiana high
schools, maintained a rule for married students as follows: "Students who are or have
been at any time married are not eligible for participating in intraschool athletic compe-
tition." 1d. at 70.
3. Prior to his marriage, Raike had participated actively in high school athletics, In-
cluding football, wrestling, and baseball.
4. Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Raike, - Ind. App.-, 329 N.E.2d 66, 69
(1975).
5. The trial court considered the case on its merits In September, 1972, following
Raike's graduation. While the issue was arguably moot at the time of the trial court de-
cision and also at the time of the appeal to the court of appeals, the latter court deemed
the issue to be "one of substantial public interest" and worthy of decision on the merits.
Id. at 71 n.3.
6. Id. at 69.
7. Id. at 77.
8. 404 U.S. 71 (1971),
9. Board of Dir's, v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 854 (1967) ; Estay v., LaFourche
Parish School Bd., 230 So. 2d 443 (l.a.. App. 1969) ; Cochrane v. Board of Educ., 360 Mich.
390, 103 N.W.2d 569 (1960); State ex rel. Baker v. Stevenson, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 233, 189
N.E.2d 181 (1962); Kissick v. Garland Ind. School Dist., 330 SW.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959), overricled by Bell v. Lone Oak Ind. Sphool Dist., 507 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974) ; Starkey v. Board of Educ., 14 Utah 2d 227, 381 P.2d 718 (1963).
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exception. 10 In so holding, the state courts have reflected the gener-
ally accepted policy of deference to the wisdom and authority of
school boards, with reference to matters of local school administra-
tion. The school boards in many of these cases had acted under sta-
tutory mandates1 ' to provide rules necessary to ensure a proper
education,'1 2 and the courts have thus expressed a strong reluctance
to enter this province of school administration in the absence of a
showing of abuse of discretion on the part of the school board. 3
As a result, the sole consideration in most of the cases has been
a determination by the court as to the reasonableness of the regu-
lation questioned; 14 there exists a presumption of validity in favor
of the regulation imposed. 2 Thus, school boards have enjoyed wide
powers in dealing with everyday school problems, such as disci-
pline", and grooming.1 7
School boards have dealt rather harshly with married students
and unwed mothers, often attempting to preclude even their attend-
ance at school. In such instances, courts find themselves embroil-
ed in substantial conflicts of policy, matching the broad discretion-
ary power of the local school board against publicly favored insti-
tutions of marriage and universal education. Courts have generally
drawn the line on school board discretion in this area and have re-
jected regulations dictating permanent' 8  or temporary 19 expulsion.
10. Bell v. Lone Oak Ind. School Dist., 507 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974), set aside
on other grounds, 515 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. 1974), where the court held a married student
activity rule discriminatory on its face and violative of the fourteenth amendment to the
U.S. Constitution.
11. See OHxo REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.20 (Supp. 1974): MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
340.614 (1967) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 279.8 (1972). See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-29-08(13)
(1971).
12. For an excellent analysis of the problems in over-extension of school board author-
ity, see Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student
Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 373 (1969).
13. See cases cited in note 9 supra.
14. The question of reasonableness sometimes goes beyond the examination of school
board policies. Decisions in the high school activities area, as in Raike, have often in-
cluded state high school activities or athletic associations.
Some courts have appeared even more reluctant to enter the domain of these volun-
tary associations than in the case of the school boards. Brown v. Wells, 288 Minn. 468, 181
N.W.2d 708 (1970) ; State ex rel. Missouri State High School Athletic Ass'n v. Schoenlaub,
507 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. 1974). Other courts, however, have rejected bans against interference
with the business of state athletic associations and have held regulations of the associa-
tions to be state action for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. Illinois
High School Ass'n, 45 Il. App. 2d 277, 195 N.E.2d 38 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960
(1965) ; rehearing denied, 980 U.S. 946 (1965) ; Sturrup v. Mahan, -Ind.--, 305 N.E.2d
877 (1974); Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., 259 Ind. 515, 289 N.E.2d 495
(1972), overruling State ex rel. Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Lawrence Circuit
Court, 240 Ind. 114, 162 N.E.2d 250 (1959).
15. State ex rel. Baker v. Stevenson, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 233, 189 N.E.2d 181 (1962); Starkey
v. Board of Educ., 14 Utah 2d 227, 381 P.2d 718 (1963).
16. See, e.g., State ex rel. Humphrey v. Adkins, 47 Ohio Op. 2d 173, 247 N.X.2d 830
(1969).
17. See, e.g., Laucher v. Simpson, 57 Ohio Op. 2d, 303, 276 N.E.2d 261 (1971). Contra;
Warren v. Board of Educ., 41 Ohio Misc. 87, 322 N.E.2d 697 (1974).
18. Nutt v. Board of Educ., 12S Kan. 507, 278 P. 1065 (1929) ; McLeod v. State ex Irel.
Colmer, 154 Miss. 468, 122 So. 737 (1929).
19. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Ind. School Dist. v. Knight, 418 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Civ.
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Although the courts have protected the married student to a
certain extent from arbitrary school board action, the question of
extracurricular activities has not been successfully addressed in
state courts prior to Raike, possibly because no expulsion was in-
volved,'20 and because the extracurricular activity was denied the
status of a "right."' 2' In the area of extracurricular activities, the
student has generally found himself at the mercy of school board
regulations, since he is unable to assert his right to education as
a counterweight to the strong presumption favoring school board
discretion. 22 In fact, state courts have permitted even wider dis-
App. 1967) ; Anderson v. Canyon Ind. School Dist., 412 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
In Board of Educ. v. Bentley, 383 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. App. 1964), the court noted:
The unreasonable and arbitrary effect of the regulation Is thus demonstrated,
since it imposes the identical result in every case, without regard to the cir-
cumstances of any case. The Board's discretion is foreclosed in advance, no
matter what the facts. Such prejudgment is unreasonable and arbitrary.
Id. at 681.
Contra, State ex rel. Thompson v. Marion County Bd. of Educ., 202 Tenn. 29, 302
S.W.2d 57 (1957), where the court upheld a temporary expulsion rule for married students:
[Any activity of students which can be said to have a reasonable bearing
on his or her influence upon the students or school is within the bounds of
reasonable regulation by the Board in the exercise of the statutory duty
vested 'in it to suspend pupils "when the progress of efficiency of the school
makes it necessary."
Id. at 33, 302 S.W.2d at 58. See State ex rel. Idle v. Chamberlain, 39 Ohio Op. 2d 262,
175 N.E.2d 539 (1961).
20. It has been suggested that school boards, having been stymied in their efforts to
control teenage marriage by expulsion, have directed their quest for control to areas of
school activities. See Knowles, High School, Marriage atnd the Fourteenth Amendment, 11
J. FAM. LAW 711 (1972).
21. See, e.g., Kissick v. Garland Ind. School Dist., 330 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959) ; Starkey v. Board of Educ., 14 Utah 2d 227, 381 P.2d 718 (1963).
The federal courts have generally afforded extracurricular activities a similar de-
nial of "rights" status. See, e.g., Brenden v. Independent School Dist. No. 742, 477 F.2d
1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, Inc., 377 F.
Supp. 1233 (D. Kan. 1973).
While many of the courts In these cases have relegated extracurricular activities
to "privilege" status, some state court decisions have recognized the importance of these
activities as an integral ingredient in the total education of the student, so that their
absence from the school program is not to be lightly, regarded. Cochrane v. Board of
Educ., 360 Mich. 390, 103 N.W.2d 569 (1960) (Kelly, J.) ; cf. Granger v. Cascade County
School Dist., 159 Mont. 516, 499 P.2d 780 (1972) : McNair v. School Dist. No. 1, 87 Mont.
423, 288 P. 188 (1930). Contra, Brown v. Wells, 288 Minn. 468, 181 N.W.2d 708 (1970) ;
State ex rel. Missouri State High School Athletic Ass'n v. Schoenlaub, 507 S.W.2d 354
(Mo. 1974). But e. Paulson v. Minidoka County School Dist. No. 331, 93 Idaho 469, 463
P.2d 935 (1970).
Federal case law would generally appear to support the proposition that, while not
a "right," extracurricular activities are to be considered as an integral part of education.
See Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Kan.
1973); Moran v. School Dist. No. 7, 350 F. Supp. 1180 (D. Mont. 1972); Lee v. Macon
County Bd. of Educ., 283 F. Supp. 194 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Kelly v. Metropolitan County
Bd. of Educ., 293 F. Supp. 485 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
22. It may be argued, at least in light of the federal decisions, that the right-privilege
dichotomy should not be controlling in the context of equal protection. Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Indeed, in a de-
cision rejecting hair length and grooming restrictions in high school athletics, a federal
district court in Vermont deemed the difference between "right" and "privilege" to be
inconsequential:
If the school district through Its elected officials extends this opportunity
to one class of student athletes, It cannot deny it to another class without
justification. A privilege may not be dispensed arbitrarily.
Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411, 415 (D. Vt. 1970).
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cretion in the area of extracurricular activities than in the area
of general school administration.2 3
In the extracurricular activities cases, state court decisions
have generally examined interests asserted by the school board,
have found these interests to be legitimate, and have upheld the
regulation.2 4 A number of basic interests noted by the defendants
in Raike,25 appear in these decisions: (1) teen-age marriages should
be discouraged;26 (2) unmarried students should not be ex-
posed to sexual discussions of married students;27 (3) married stu-
dents should not become school heroes or models, through possible
success in extracurricular activities; 28 (4) possible discipline prob-
lems from the emancipated married students should be avoided; 29
and (5) married students 'should be afforded adequate time to de-
vote to the formative years of marriage.2 0
When presented with the further argument that the regulations
in question serve to punish teen-age marriage, state courts have
looked to the stringent statutory restrictions of teen-age marriage
to find that public policy discourages youthful marriage. Thus, the
courts have found that such school board regulation is merely a
manifestation of a legislatively expressed policy.3 1
The federal courts appear to offer a more sympathetic forum
for student claims, allowing a more subjective analysis of student
problems, detached from the presumption of school board reason-
ableness2 2 The United State Supreme Court recognized basic con-
23. See Bunger v. Iowa High School Athletic Ass'n, 197 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1972) :
In dealing with ineligibility for extracurricular activities as contrasted to
expulsion from school altogether, and with students who represent the school
in interscholastic activities as contrasted to less active sudents, school rules
may be broader and still be reasonable.
Id. at 565.
24. See cases cited In note 9 supra.
25. - Ind. App. at - , 329 N.E.2d at 70.
26. The basic question presented by this often-quoted objective Is the authority of the
school board to function within this area of legislative concern. See Goldstein, supra note
12, at 387.
27. This objective is usually supported by the contention that teacher control is less ap-
parent, the opportunity for "corruption" thus being more readily available, outside the
classroom. It may be questioned, however, whether conversation around the water foun-
tain and in the school cafeteria should be banned for the same reasons. Board of Dir's v.
Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 854 (1967); see Knowles, supra note 20, at 729. See
also Berwick & Oppenheimer, Marriage, Pregnancy, and the Right to Go to School, 50
TEXAS L. REV. 1196, 1207-11 (1972), where the authors touch upon possible freedom of
expression questions in this area.
28. See State ex rel. Baker v. Stevenson, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 233, 189 N.E.2d 181 (1962).
where the court noted the impact of the professional sports hero upon the American sports
public and questioned whether high school students could be any less susceptible.
29. See Board of Dir's v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260. 147 N.W.2d 854 (1967); Cochrone v.
Board of Educ., 360 Mich. 390, 103 N.W.2d 569 (1960) (Kavanagh, J.).
30. See Starkey v. Board of Educ., 14 Utah 2d 227, 381 P.2d 718 (1963).
31. See State ex rel. Baker v. Stevenson, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 233, 189 N.E.2d 181 (1962)
Board of Dir's v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 854 (1967). The Ralke court failed
to find such policy disfavor, instead noting that public policy permitted teen-age marriage
under certain circumstances. - Ind. App. at -, 329 N.E.2d at 884.
32. See generally Shull v. Columbus Municipal Separate School Dist., 338 P. Supp. 1376
(N.D. Miss. 1972); Perry v. Grenada Municipal Separate School Dist., 300 F. Supp. 718
(N.D. Miss. 1969).
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stitutional rights of students, in Tinker v. Des Moines School Dis-
trict,33 and constitutional analysis for students has been followed
in lower federal courts, in areas of sex classifications, 34 race classif-
ications, 35 grooming standards, 3  and due process deprivations."
By invoking equal protection concepts of "suspect classifications"
and "fundamental rights," many challenging students have been
able to avoid the perils of the traditional "resonableness" test and
have thus been able to avoid the perils of the traditional "reasonable
ness" test and thus have been able to force the defending school dis-
trict or sctivitv pseociation to show a compelling interest in. justifica-
tion for its action."
It is not suprising, therefore, that students have pressed the con-
cept of "new" 3 9 equal protection in the federal courts to overturn
married student activity rules, 4) the courts holding that the regu-
lations in question cannot withstand the requirement of a compel-
ling state interest under strict scrutiny. 41
One problem with the application of strict scrutiny in student
rights cases is its limited area of application; i.e., the student must
show infringement upon a "suspect classification" or a "fundamen-
tal right. ' '42 While no court has conclusively recognized education
as a fundamental right,43 two federal decisions have focused on the
potentially fundamental right of marriage.44 The court in Davis v.
33. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
34. Brenden v. Independent School Dist. No. 742, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Gilpin
V. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Kan. 1973).
35. See Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 283 F. Supp. 194 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
36. Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970).
37. Kelly v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 293 F. Supp. 485 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
38. This "new" equal protection envisions a two-tiered system of scrutiny, under which
the minimal scrutiny of "old" equal protection (presumption in favor of validity of the
state action) is supplemented by a higher level of strict scrutiny (presumption against
state action can be rebutted only by showing a compelling state interest in the action).
See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) ; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
It is generally agreed that the choice of an appropriate test under the two-tiered
"new" equal protection dictates the result. If the plaintiff can show a "fundamental In-
terest" or a "suspect category," the strict test is applied and the state can rarely satis-
fy the compelling interest requirement. On the other hand, if the plaintiff is unable to
trigger high level scrutiny, the state can easily overcome the plaintiff's challenge by show-
ing any rationality for the regulation. See, e.g., Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v.
Raike, -Ind. App.-, 329 N.E.2d 66, 73 (1975) : "The importance of the standard of
review adopted is that the result reached is in large part a product of that Initial deci-
sion."
39. See generally note 38 supra; Forum: Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2 HAs-
TINGS CONST. LAW QUARTERLY 645 (1975), where four distinguished law professors discuss
"old," "new," and "newer" equal protection scrutiny.
40. Davis v. Meek, 344 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Holt v. Shelton, 341 F. Supp.
821 (M.D. Tenn. 1972).
41. id.
42. "Suspect" categorization would seem Inapplicable to the married student situation.
See Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Raike, - Ind. App.- , 329 N.E.2d 86, 73
(1975) : "Obviously, a 'suspect' classification is not involved (is not based on race, alien-
age or national origin)." Id.
43. See generally note 21 supra. But see Holt v. Shelton, 341 F. Supp. 821 (M.D. Tenn.
1972), where the court, in light of the United States Supreme Court decision in Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), notes that "it is strongly arguable that the right to
an education is, itself, more than a mere 'right' but a 'fundamental right.' " Holt v. Shel-
ton, supra, at 823 n.3.
44. See note 40 supra.
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Meek45 found an invasion of the fundamental right to marital pri-
vacy, as guaranteed in Griswold v. Connecticut,4 6 in a married stu-
dent activity rule. It may be questioned, however, whether a, doc-
trine that originated in the marital bedroom can logically be extend-
ed to include invasions of that privacy in the schoolhouse. The s-ec-
ond federal decision, Holt v. Shelton, 7 held that a married student
rule infringed upon the fundamental right to marry, allegedIy re-
cognized in Loving v. Virginia.45  While the Holt reasoning seems
more logical than notions of marital privacy in the married student
cases, it has been questioned whether Loving ever guaranteed a
fundamental right to marry.49
Thus, a student challenging married student activity rules! may
be faced with almost certain rejection under the reasonableness
test of the older cases, 50 or with a very questionable basis of argu-
ment under the compelling interest requirement of high scrutiny.
The apparent solution for the student would seem to be a third meth-
od of equal protection analysis, such as that endorsed by the Raike
court.5 '
In Raike, the court expressly adopted an intermediate approach
to equal protection 2 and determined that intermediate scrutiny was
the "fair and substantial relation" concept of Reed.5 3 By endorsing
45. 844 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
46. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
47. 341 F. Supp. 821 (M.D. Tenn. 1972), noted in 40 TENN. L. REV. 268 (1973).
48. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
49. See, e.g., Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Raike, - Ind. App.-, 329 N.E.2d
66, 75 (1975). But see Van Doren, Constitutional Rights of High School Students, 23
DRAKE L. REV. 403, 414 (1973).
50. But see Van Doren, supra note 49; Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Raike,
- Ind. App.-, 329 N.E.2d 66 (1975), where the court concluded: "It Is possible to
apply the low scrutiny test to the Rules and conclude that there is no rational basis what-
soever to support such a classification." Id. at 77.
51. - Ind. App. at- , 329 N.E.2d at 73.
52. Id. at - , 329 N.E.2d at 7S.
53. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
The intermediate level of scrutiny has been characterized as a more rigorous testing of
equal protection cases without invoking the limited concept of strict scrutiny. Thus, the
court is able to avoid value judgments on the legitimacy of legislative purpose and can
assess the "rationality of means" utilized by the state to meet the expressed objectives
of the state. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1972) ; Comment, "Newer" Equal Protection: The Impact of the Means-Focused Model,
23 BUFFALO L. REv. 665 (1974).
The Raike court equated the "substantial relation" concept of Reed with the "slid-
Ing scale" approach advocated by Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court and
with the "means" model introduced by Professor Gunther. While all three approaches
operate between the extreme tiers of the "new" equal protection, it is arguable that at
least a conceptual difference exists among the theories. While the Reed and Gunther
models break away from the mold of two-tiered equal protection, the "sliding scale" de-
termination of Justice Marshall offers a more realistic application of an equal protection
test which recognizes important rights and interests.
As the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the noncon-
stitutional interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes more
fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is
Infringed on a discriminatory basis must be adjusted accordingly.
San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 102-103 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
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this "newer" equal protection,5 4  the Indiana court recognized its
ability to reject married student regulations even if such regulations
were found to have some rational relation to a legitimate state pur-
pose,"5 a finding which would have foreclosed equal protection chal-
lenge under the traditional approach 56 The regulations of Rushville
and the Indiana High School Athletic Association, the court conclud-
ed, were both under-5 7 and over-inclusive,5 8 thus falling within the
mandate of Reed:
A classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and sub-
stantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all per-
sons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." 59
While Raike is perhaps the most explicit adoption of this "new-
er" equal protection in the extracurricular activity area, earlier de-
cisions appear to have applied a similar approach. Perhaps the
strongest adoption of intermediate scrutiny appears on Moran v.
School District No. 7, Yellowstone County,'5 where the court recogniz-
ed the importance of extracurricular activities as an "integral part
of the total education process,' ' 1 and gave even greater weight to
the rights of marriage, -G2 requiring a showing of "substantial evid-
ence" of the legitimate concern of the school board.6 3 Two other
federal decisions 64 and one state decision 5 also appear to fall with-
in the general area of something-more-than-minimal scrutiny, but
all three cases also hint at applications of -the two-tiered approach,
thus offering questionable precedent in the "intermediate" scrutiny
field.66
54. See Gunther, supra note 53.
55. - Ind. App. at- , 329 N.E.2d at 78. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
where the court rejected a probate classificaion although it was "not without some legiti-
macy."
56. See, e.g., Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Raike, - Ind. App.-, 329
N.E.2d 66, 72 (1975).
57. The court found that the regulations excluding married students from extracurricu-
lar activities failed to place a similar burden on other students who were just as likely
to exhibit the corrupting influence which the regulations sought to eliminate. Id. at -,
329 N.E.2d at 77.
58. The court also found that the regulations included some married students of "good
moral character" who would not corrupt school morality, thus extending rule coverage
beyond the necessary limits. Id.
59. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), citing Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
60. 350 F. Supp. 1180 (D. Mont. 1972).
61. Id. at 1184.
62. Id. at 1186. The court also expressed concern over the validity of any school board
action in the area of marriage, endorsing the views of Goldstein, supra note 12.
63. Moran v. School Dist. No. 7, 350 F. Supp. 1180 (D. Mont. 1972).
64. See Hollon v. Mathis Ind. School Dist., 358 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D. Tex. 1973), vacated
on other grounds, 491 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974); Romais v. Crenshaw, 354 F. Supp. 868
(S.D. Tex. 1972), analyzed in Berwick and Oppenheimer, supra note 27.
65. See Bell v. Lone Oak Ind. School Dist., 507 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974), set
aside on other grounds, 515 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. 1974).
66. Bell v. Lone Oak Ind. School Dist., 507 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (Ray,
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The problems with married student activity rules offer good
examples of the faulty nature of the two-tiered approach to equal
protection scrutiny. As noted above, two rights are involved in the
married student analysis: the right to carry and, at least arguably,
the right to a full education, both rights being uniformly recogniz-
ed as important and "nearly" fundamental. Under the older equal
protection and also under the more modern two-tiered approach,
these important interests of marriage and education are not ade-
quately protected, since the two "nearly" fundamental rights, even
when juxtaposed in the married student situation, cannot add to a
full fundamental interest worthy of strict scrutiny protection. Under
intermediate equal protection scrutiny, as espoused in Raike, or
as perceived by other intermediate equal protection concepts the
"means" approach of Professor Gunther6 7 or the "sliding scale"
concept of Justice Marshall,68 appropriate consideration could be
given to the total effect of the interests which are being infringed, 61
unhindered by an unrealistically rigid system of equal protection
testing.
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J., and Cornelius, J., concurring, both spoke in terms of fundamental rights, but seemed
more concerned with application of an equal protection test somewhere beyond minimal
scrutiny); Hollon v. Mathis Ind. School Dist., 358 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D. Tex. 1973), va-
cated on other grounds, 491 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974) (concern shown for protection of pos-
sible scholarship and marriage rights but decision also talked of the 'rationality' of mini-
mal scrutiny); Romans v. Crenshaw, 354 F. Supp. 868 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (emphasis on
marriage infringement and the means of classification, although court did speak in terms
of simple 'rationality'),
67. Gunther, supra note 53.
68. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 102-03 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
69. See generally note 53 supra.
